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Abstract 
 
Software Risk Management (RM) within Medical 
Device (MD) companies is a critical area.  Failure of 
the software can have potentially catastrophic effects, 
leading to injury of patients or even death.  Therefore 
regulators penalise MD manufacturers that do not 
devote sufficient attention to the areas of hazard 
analysis and RM throughout the software lifecycle.  
This paper describes the experience of a MD 
software development organization when they engaged 
in a research project to improve their RM practices. 
We explain how this was achieved through the 
development of a software process improvement RM 
model that integrates regulatory MD RM requirements 
with the goals and practices of the Capability Maturity 
Model Integration (CMMI). This model is known as the 
Risk Management Capability Model (RMCM). The 
authors describe the complete project lifecycle and 
evaluate the success of the project. 
 
1.  Context 
 
RM is a very necessary aspect of all software 
development projects.  The absence of RM within 
software projects can lead to failures and loss at several 
levels.  Barry Boehm has defined the degree to which a 
software project may be exposed to failure i.e. risk 
exposure, as the probability of an unsatisfactory 
outcome and the loss to the parties affected if the 
outcome is unsatisfactory [6].  Two key terms from 
this definition are “unsatisfactory outcome” and “loss”.  
However, RM is industry-specific.  Within the MD 
industry, RM aims to manage software risk from a 
safety perspective.  The MD industry and its associated 
regulators view “unsatisfactory outcome” and “loss” in 
terms of loss of life, injury or damage to the operator, 
subject, bystander or environment.  Therefore, software 
quality in the MD sector is defined and measured 
against these criteria.     
MD companies are responsible for ensuring they 
take adequate precautions to produce safe and efficient 
software that does not pose a severe hazard should a 
software-related failure occur.  An issue facing MD 
companies producing software is that it is not practical, 
even in the simplest software programs, to fully test all 
possible execution paths.  Therefore, the quality of 
software cannot be determined by software testing 
alone.  A simple change in a software component can 
cause unforeseen problems in other components within 
the system, which could go undetected unless a robust 
RM, software design and implementation process 
exists.  Safe MD software depends on solid software 
engineering practices [12] with RM being a core 
practice.   
Although MDs and associated software are 
developed to increase the well-being of patients, the 
MD industry and governments are faced with the 
challenge that MDs fail to operate properly on 
occasion, or are misused in ways that are associated 
with injuries and death. According to the Institute of 
Medicine report “To Err is Human”, between 44,000 to 
98,000 people die throughout the world in hospital 
from preventative medical errors [22]. The report also 
says that more people die every year in the USA as a 
result of medical errors than from motor vehicle 
accidents, breast cancer or AIDS.  Another challenge 
facing both the MD industry and global governments 
include the illegal sale of sub-standard devices which 
fail to meet minimum quality and safety standards, 
therefore putting further lives at risk.  
To tackle the issue, governments have put in place 
regulatory bodies whose job it is to define regulatory 
systems for MDs.  The goal is to protect the public 
from faulty software which may be placed into MDs 
and thus reduce the risk of potential injury [13].  MD 
companies wishing to market in those countries must 
prove compliance with the regulatory system.   
Typically, before a MD company can sell their 
product in a country, they must follow the registration 
or licensing procedure of that country.  This in turn 
establishes a contract between the device manufacturer 
and that country, whereby the device manufacturer is 
obligated to perform both pre-market and post-market 
duties as defined in the quality system requirements.  
The quality system is defined as the organisational 
structure, responsibilities, procedures, processes and 
resources required to implement quality management.  
It may cover the methods, facilities and controls used 
by the manufacturer in design, manufacturer, 
packaging, labelling, storage, installation, servicing 
and post-market handling of MDs.  Applicable 
requirements are typically directly related to the class 
of the device.  However hazard analysis and RM are 
key components that are applicable to all classes of 
device.  The regulatory or approved body, through 
audits, checks conformance to the quality system 
requirements periodically.  By conforming to the 
quality system requirements, the device manufacturer 
is being pro-active and demonstrates a tightly 
controlled manufacturing system, which in turn 
provides for greater reliability, safety and effectiveness 
in the device. 
In the US, all MDs containing software are subject 
to the United States Quality Systems Regulation, 21 
CFR 820 [14].  The regulations stipulate the 
requirement for risk analysis as part of the design 
validation process.  Because there is little guidance in 
Europe on the information that should be included in a 
MD Technical File for CE-marking, many companies 
use relevant US guidance documents [11].  As such, 
this research integrates guidance by the US regulatory 
agencies. 
 
2. What was the goal? 
 
The aim of this project was to improve the software 
RM process within an Irish MD organization i.e. 
Vitalograph Ltd. This is a privately owned company 
that was established in the 1960’s.  The company 
manufacturers devices that are used in the diagnosis 
and monitoring of vital physiological processes.  The 
electronic devices, which the company produces fall 
into several categories including: hand-held personal 
devices containing embedded software; larger office 
based devices containing embedded software which 
include the capability to interact with PC based 
software; pure electronic/mechanical devices that do 
not themselves contain software.   
Vitalograph’s primary markets include clinical 
trials, primary care, occupational health, sports 
medicine, asthma management, emergency services 
and hospitals.  Their products are represented in 113 
countries throughout the world through local 
distributors. Its headquarters are located in the U.K. 
and additional offices are located in the U.S.A. and 
Germany.  These offices support the sales, training and 
service teams.  The manufacturing and research and 
development (R&D) facilities are based in Ireland.   
Following initial discussions with the General 
Manager of Vitalograph Ireland, it was agreed that the 
research would focus on improving the company’s 
software RM framework, as it was believed their 
existing RM framework required re-aligning with the 
latest regulatory standards and guidance.   Our aim was 
to create a RM framework which when followed, 
would ensure that any software developed by the 
company, adhering to the framework, would be 
compliant with respect to regulatory RM requirements.  
  The desired future state for the organisation was to 
have in place a more comprehensive and reusable 
software hazard analysis and RM procedure with 
associated templates, which could be used in the 
production of MD software including both embedded 
and desktop software applications.  The procedures 
should be in full compliance with the RM requirements 
set forth by the FDA for marketing in the USA and BSI 
for marketing in Europe.  It was expected that this 
would lead to safer and more efficient software design 
and device development.  It was desirable that the 
resulting RM framework be comprehensive enough to 
satisfy regulatory requirements of other regulatory 
bodies in the future.  Therefore, the focus and content 
of the resulting framework could not be restricted to 
just FDA and BSI guidance documents. 
 
3. Approach used to achieve the goal 
   
The research question we are investigating is: “Can the 
RMCM assist MD companies in improving their 
software RM practices and put them on the path to 
regulatory compliance?”  To answer this question we 
trialed  the RMCM in Vitalograph Ltd., an Irish MD  
company that produces both embedded and desktop 
application software for their devices. A five phase 
cyclical action research approach [5, 24], involving 
diagnosing, action planning, action taking, evaluating 
and specifying learning was used to perform this 
research. As action research normally includes multiple 
cycles it was ideally suited to this research project. 
Additionally, it was also suited to this project as one of 
the researchers was an employee of Vitalograph, in the 
role of Principal Engineer of Application Software, 
Quality Assurance and Customised software. This 
experience report discusses cycle 1 and the proposed 
modifications for cycle 2 of the research project.  
4. Establishing the research environment 
(Diagnosing) 
 
The research commenced with the establishment of 
the research environment.  This was agreed to be the 
R&D department of Vitalograph.  The boundaries of 
the research area were defined to be software RM.  
The diagnosing stage commenced with discussions 
with the client on existing issues within the software 
development environment, focusing specifically on 
process and procedures.  Vitalograph is bound legally 
by the regulatory bodies of the countries in which it 
markets.  The two primary regulatory bodies of 
concern for the organization include the British 
Standards Institution (BSI) who regulate European 
sales and the FDA in the USA.  The regulatory bodies 
regularly review the organisation’s process and 
procedures, through audits, to ensure the organisation 
is compliant with the regulations set out by the bodies.  
To this end, the organisation has a solid base of 
documented process and procedures encapsulated in 
development handbooks, standard operating 
procedures and templates. 
As an employee of the organization, one of the 
researchers was trained on existing procedures, 
including the hazard analysis and RM procedure. 
Access was also provided to all of the company’s 
standard operating procedures and the templates used 
in the design and development of new software 
products.  The researcher also had the capacity to 
update the organisation’s software related procedures, 
which when modified and released back into the 
organisation, have a direct and immediate impact on all 
new software developed.  This is because any new 
software developed must adhere to the latest 
procedures, which have been released into the quality 
system. 
 
5. Development of the proposed solution 
(Action Planning) 
 
In response to research problem, the researchers 
developed the RMCM.  The RMCM was developed to 
assist Vitalograph in meeting the MD regulations for 
RM through adopting disciplined software engineering 
practices. The model has been designed to be flexible 
in that relevant elements of the model may be adopted 
as required to provide the most significant benefit to 
the business. The model is based on the CMMI
®
 [9] 
and the regulations used to extend the CMMI
®
 
framework are those of the FDA [15,16,17,18], ISO 
14971 [3], ANSI/AAMI/IEC 62304:2006 standard 
(IEC 62304) (MD software – Software life cycle 
processes) [4] and   EN 60601-1-4 [7]. Additionally, 
reference was made to IEC 60812 [19], GAMP 4 [20], 
GAMP 5 [21], TIR 32 [2] and guidance from the 
AAMI (Association for the Advancement of Medical 
Instrumentation) on RM [1]. The RMCM contains an 
assessment method that provides a means of assessing 
the software engineering capability for the RM process 
area in relation to MD software (both application and 
embedded software).  
The RMCM is a foundation upon which to promote 
software practices into the RM process adopted by MD 
companies. This is expected to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of RM within MD 
companies through mapping MD regulatory guidelines 
against the CMMI
®
 RM process area. The mappings 
between the MD regulatory guidelines and the CMMI
®
 
specific practices for the RM process result in the 
RMCM being composed of a number of goals and 
practices. Goals and practices may be either generic 
(relating to the entire organisation) or specific (relating 
directly to the RM process).  The RMCM determines 
what parts of the CMMI
®
 RM process area (part A of 
Figure 1) are required to satisfy MD regulations (part B 
of Figure 1).   
 
 
Figure 1. Composition of the RMCM 
 
The RMCM also investigates the possibility of 
extending the CMMI
®
 process areas with additional 
practices that are outside the remit of CMMI
®
, but are 
required in order to satisfy MD regulatory guidelines 
(part C of Figure 1). Additionally, the RMCM provides 
MD companies with the opportunity to incorporate 
practices from the CMMI
®
 that are not required in 
order to achieve regulatory compliance but that would 
greatly enhance their RM process if they were included  
(part D of Figure 1). The RMCM will help companies 
to measure their organisational RM capability and to 
track their progression against the following software 
process capability levels (see Table 1): 
RMCM Level Med – Companies must 
demonstrate that they satisfy the goals and perform the 
practices required to meet the requirements of the 
various MD regulatory guidelines and standards 
associated with RM. This will involve performing 
some practices which the CMMI
®
 views as generic, 
although not to the extent of fulfilling any generic 
goals. 
RMCM Level 0 – Insufficient practices have been 
performed to satisfy the requirements of Level Med. 
RMCM Level 1 - Companies must demonstrate 
that they satisfy RMCM level Med and the CMMI
®
 
capability level 1 goal of performing the CMMI
®
 RM 
base practices. 
RMCM Level 2 – Companies must demonstrate 
that they satisfy RMCM level 1 and additionally 
perform CMMI
®
 RM Advanced Practices, as well as 
the CMMI
®
 capability level 2 generic goal of 
institutionalising a Managed Process. 
RMCM Level 3 - Companies must demonstrate 
that they satisfy RMCM level 2 and additionally the 
CMMI
®
 Generic Goal to Institutionalise a Defined 
Process (CMMI
®
 Generic Goal 3) for the RM process 
area. 
RMCM Level 4 – Companies must demonstrate 
that they satisfy RMCM level 3 and additionally the 
CMMI
®
 Generic Goal to Institutionalise a 
Quantitatively Managed Process (CMMI
®
 Generic 
Goal 4) for the RM process area. 
RMCM Level 5 - Companies must demonstrate that 
a process area satisfies RMCM level 4 and 
additionally the CMMI
®
 Generic Goal to 
Institutionalise an Optimising Process (CMMI
®
 
Generic Goal 5) for the RM process area. 
The RMCM is composed of 5 Generic Goals 
(GGs). The first of these GGs requests that three 
specific goals (SG): (SG1: Preparing for RM, SG2: 
Identify and Analyse Risks & SG3: Mitigate Risks) 
are satisfied.  Each specific goal is composed of a 
number of practices and sub-practices, with each 
practice consisting of a number of sub-practices. For 
example, SG1. Preparing for RM consists of 3 
practices: Determine risk sources and categories, 
Determine risk parameters, and Establish a RM 
strategy.  
Table 1, illustrates how the Determine risk sources 
and categories sub-practice consists of 5 sub-practices 
and each sub-practice is assigned an RMCM capability 
level. Practices that are indicated in bold italics were 
not included in the CMMI RM process area and had to 
be added to provide coverage of the MD regulations. 
 
Table 1: RMCM Sub-practices for determining 
risk sources and categories 
Practice: Determine Risk Sources and Categories 
Sub-Practice 
Number 
Sub-Practice RMCM 
Level 
1 Determine risk sources Med 
2 Determine risk categories Med 
3 Determine software hazards  Med 
4 Include failure in the OTS 
software as a potential hazard  
Med 
5 Include hardware failures as a 
potential hazard 
Med 
   
Table 2 summarises the RMCM, illustrating the 
RMCM capability levels for sub-practices belonging to 
a particular practice. To achieve a determined 
capability level for any of the RMCM goals, it is 
necessary for the associated practices and sub-practices 
(with an assigned capability level less than or equal to 
the desired capability level) to be performed (Detailed 
in [8, 23]). The generic goals GG2-GG5 are not broken 
down to the sub-practice level. Therefore, the 
capability level is assigned at the practice level within 
these goals. 
The RMCM contains 59 sub-practices, with level 
Med containing 41 of these sub-practices. Only 21 of 
the 39 CMMI
®
 RM sub-practices are included in the 
RMCM level Med. Therefore, following the MD 
regulations will only partially meet the goals of this 
CMMI
®
 process area, with only specific goal 1 being 
fully satisfied. The RMCM also shows that 35 specific 
sub-practices have to be performed in order to satisfy 
MD regulations and that only an additional 8 sub-
practices are required to satisfy all the CMMI
®
 level 1 
(or RMCM level 1) requirements.  
Meeting the goals of the RM process area by 
performing the CMMI
®
 specific practices would not 
meet the requirements of the MD software regulations 
as an additional 20 MD specific sub-practices had to be 
added to meet the objectives of RMCM. 
 
Table 2: Summary of the RMCM 
 
 
6. Gap Analysis using the proposed 
solution (Action Taking - Part I) 
 
The RMCM was used to perform a gap analysis in 
determining which practices were missing or not 
adequately addressed in the MD company’s software 
RM procedure. The RMCM provided the researcher 
with a solid tool for examining the MD company’s 
existing RM framework.  Using the RMCM, the 
researcher could perform a gap analysis on what 
already existed in the MD company versus what was 
required to satisfy regulatory requirements.  Each 
specific goal and its associated sub-practices within the 
RMCM were examined and compared against the 
organisations existing practices.  Specific goals and 
sub-practices, which were required but not addressed 
in the organisation’s standard operating procedures and 
templates, were noted so that they could be addressed.  
Note that the researcher’s focus was solely on those 
goals and practices at level Med.  This was the level of 
maturity required by the Vitalograph. Therefore, the 
remaining tables listed in this paper show only those 
practices related to level Med. 
In evaluating the RMCM and its impact upon the 
company’s RM practices, the authors initially analysed 
the company’s standard operating procedures and 
associated design templates (DTs) for performing 
software RM.  Analysis was performed to determine 
the state of the company’s software RM procedures 
prior to the implementation of the RMCM. The 
analysis involved examining each goal and associated 
practices within the RMCM, identifying what was 
required to meet the goals of the RMCM and then 
determining if that goal had been satisfied through the 
company’s existing standard operating procedures and 
DTs or other records such as training logs.   
The analysis showed that prior to the introduction 
of the RMCM, 9 out of the 35 required base practices 
(i.e. level Med practices for SG1 to SG3) were 
adequately addressed by the company’s standard 
operating procedures and DTs.  Twenty-six were found 
to be missing and 1 was insufficient as it only partially 
met the requirement laid out by the RMCM for the 
practice.  The findings are summarised in table 3.  
 
Table 3. Gap analysis findings 
Goal Activities 
required by 
regulation 
Activities satisfied 
by company 
procedures  
SG 1: Prepare for RM 16 3 
SG 2: Identify and 
Analyse Risks 
8 3 (plus an additional 
1 incomplete) 
SG 3: Mitigate Risks 11 3 
GG2: Institutionalise a 
Managed Process 
6 6 
GG3: Institutionalise a 
Defined Process 
0 0 
GG4: Institutionalise a 
Quantitatively Managed 
Process 
0 0 
GG5: Institutionalise an 
Optimising Process 
0 0 
Total 41 15 
What is interesting about the initial analysis is that 
all 6 of the practices required to satisfy level Med for 
Generic Goal 2 of the RMCM had been met by the MD 
company.  However, establishing the policy, planning 
the process, providing resources, assigning 
responsibility, training people and identifying 
stakeholders can be seen to be ineffective if the base 
practices (i.e. SG1 –SG3) themselves are insufficient in 
terms of the practices it addresses. 
 
7. How the company’s RM practices were 
changed  (Action Taking - Part II) 
 
With the gap analysis findings at hand, the 
researchers commenced the development of a new RM 
framework for Vitalograph.  This entailed a significant 
re-write of the client’s RM standard operating 
procedure and template, as well as integration of the 
RM process into the top-level software development 
procedure. 
A new software RM procedure was created to 
address missing and inadequate practices as identified 
through the RMCM gap analysis.  The procedure was 
released into the company’s quality management 
system and implemented in MD software projects.  
This is referred to as cycle 1 of the action research 
cycle.    
The RMCM was implemented within a MD 
company over a period of two years covering 5 
software projects consisting of 2 embedded software 
projects and 3 desktop software projects. The next 
section reports  the evaluation of the RMCM for cycle 
1 of the action research project and the effect it has had 
thus far on the company’s software RM activities.  
Suggestions are made for modifications to both the 
RMCM and the company’s implementation of the 
RMCM practices for a further cycle in this research. 
 
8. What happened when the new solution 
was implemented (Evaluation) 
 
The updated revision of the company’s software 
RM procedure was analysed with respect to the 
required RMCM level Med practices by repeating the 
gap analysis process described above.  We found that 
all required level Med practices listed in the RMCM 
were addressed by the latest revision of the company’s 
software RM procedure.  This was no surprise given 
that the RMCM was central in determining what 
practices were missing or inadequate and should be 
addressed within the subsequent revision.   
The RMCM has had a positive effect on the MD 
company (e.g. Table 4, illustrates the effect of the 
changes that were made in relation to the practice of 
Determining risk sources and categories).  It has 
provided them with a single reference point for 
determining their capability with respect to the 
required RM practices, enabling them to quickly 
identify what practices were missing or inadequate 
with respect to MD regulations.  It has provided them 
with a source to refer to when addressing the missing 
practices deemed essential by the MD regulators in 
achieving safe and efficient software. 
 
Table 4. Post-RMCM implementation findings 
RMCM 
Sub-
Practice 
Change Effect of Change 
1 Updated software RM 
procedure and 
template with a 
requirement to 
identify risk sources. 
More comprehensive 
analysis of potential risk 
sources. Sources are 
identified and tabulated 
within client’s RM 
documents.   
2 Updated software RM 
procedure and 
template with 
requirement to 
categorise risk 
sources.   
Better categorisation of 
risks. Risks can now be 
found, reviewed and 
analysed by category. 
3 The client’s RM 
template was updated 
with a revised list of 
potential hazards and 
hazard categories. 
The client’s software 
RM template complies 
with the latest ISO 
14971 standard. 
4 Requirement to 
analyse OTS failure as 
a potential hazard has 
been added to client’s 
procedure and 
template 
Off-the-shelf (OTS) is 
now considered during 
hazard and risk analysis 
in the project files 
examined. 
5 Requirement to 
analyse hardware 
failures as a potential 
hazard added to 
client’s procedure and 
template  
Hardware failures now 
considered during 
hazard and risk analysis 
in project files 
examined. 
 
The following sections evaluate the impact the RMCM based 
software RM procedure had upon the MD company since its 
formal release. The findings are based upon employee 
interviews and where possible are supported by other 
available document sources. 
The interview participants were categorised as 
Project Management, Software QA (Senior and Junior) 
and Software Development (Senior and Junior).  The 
participants spanned both PC software and embedded 
software, with the software developers seeing their 
roles as being distinctly related to either embedded or 
PC software but not both.  The software QA team on 
the other hand saw their role as involving interaction 
with both embedded and PC software, and both 
software development teams.  Inspection of the teams 
training records supported the roles and responsibilities 
the interviewees assigned themselves. The participants 
had been employed in the company for varying lengths 
of time ranging from zero (new employees) to two 
years, two to five years and more than five years.  
Those participants with greater than two and a half 
years experience in the company had exposure to what 
processes existed in the company prior to the 
implementation of the RMCM model in the company. 
  
8.1. Safety  
 
The interview participants recognised that the 
software hazard analysis and risk management 
procedure is one method of ensuring safety pre-
production.  All team members demonstrated an 
awareness of the new procedure.  However, the project 
manager also discussed user trials, not mentioned in 
the RMCM, as a method for ensuring safer software 
pre-production.  Sub-practice 16 of the RMCM [8,23] 
mentions the analysis of post-production queries and 
issues to safeguard against a risk scenario arising post-
production that were not originally considered during 
development.  User trials could also be used for similar 
analysis but before the software actually goes into 
production.  Therefore the practice of performing user 
trials pre-production shall be added to the RMCM, but 
not as a level Med requirement because it’s not a 
regulatory requirement.   
The team members discussed dealing with non-
conformance requests through the completion of 
corrective actions/preventative actions (CAPAs) and 
both fixing and testing any software related bugs/issues 
through unit testing and system testing.  This is in 
keeping with the company’s procedures, which states 
“all post-production RM activities are covered by (the 
company’s) CAPA system.”  Only one team member, a 
software QA engineer, alluded to updating the software 
RM report when dealing with post production queries 
and issues.  Sub-practice 16 of the RMCM references 
how three of the major MD related standards point to 
this as a very important practice. Therefore it is 
surprising that only one team member discussed this 
practice in relation to safety post-production. The 
RMCM addresses the need for this practice.  However, 
both the way in which this practice has been integrated 
into the MD company’s procedures and the training 
that individuals have received in this respect does not 
appear to be sufficient.  On inspection of the 
company’s procedure it states that changes must be 
analysed “to determine if any changes have taken place 
that adversely affect the risk analysis and mitigation”.  
This is mentioned under the life-cycle phases section 
of the procedure but does not appear under the post-
production information section.   
In the past couple of years, since the RMCM was 
introduced to the company, the team has recognised an 
improvement in both software quality and safety.  
Although there have been several projects 
implemented since the introduction of the RMCM, the 
projects were long-term design developments and a 
short term evaluation of their effectiveness is not 
possible within the scope of this work.  The devices 
and associated software are relatively new with respect 
to the time they have been in production, i.e. they have 
all been released within the last six months. It is 
important to state that there have not been any post-
production complaints raised in relation to software 
quality or safety since the product releases.  However it 
cannot be said definitively whether this is due to 
effective and efficient software risk management or 
whether it is due to product immaturity in the market. 
From a positive perspective, one of the new 
software devices has been released for a clinical trial 
with a major pharmaceutical client.  Prior to 
commencing the trial the client performed user trials 
on the software.  There were no major issues raised 
during the user trial with respect to software safety or 
quality.  Furthermore, the pharmaceutical client 
commented how this was a rare finding based on their 
experience on performing user trials on other third 
party software. 
 
8.2. Change control 
 
The Centre for Devices and Radiological Health 
reviewed MD recalls due to software failures between 
1983 to 1991 and estimated that 90% were due to 
inadequate design and 19% were caused by inadequate 
change control [10]. This highlights the importance of 
both adequate change control and proper impact 
analysis of requirements changes.  In this respect, the 
RMCM addresses change control in sub-practices 1 
and 2 for determining risk sources and risk categories.  
It states that as per FDA requirements “it is important 
to define risk-related functions when analysing 
requirements and to monitor this ongoing source of 
risk throughout the lifecycle process as requirements 
change”. 
Upon initial analysis of the interview transcripts it 
appeared that the team recognised the need to perform 
software risk analysis following changes to 
requirements.  However, further investigation revealed 
that it was QA who updated the software RM 
document at the end of the life-cycle because “the 
software hazard analysis document was not kept in line 
with the changes to the software requirements”. As no 
updated requirements specification or updated software 
risk analysis was received there could be no way of 
providing traceability from the changes, to risk 
analysis, to mitigation/control and to verification.  
Additional testing was implemented by QA to ensure 
there were no adverse side effects.  The evaluation has 
highlighted inadequate software risk analysis being 
performed in the company with respect to change 
control. A follow-up discussion was held to determine 
why the new process was not being followed. This 
highlighted a number of short-comings in the 
company’s procedures.  Within the company, all 
changes to the software are detailed in a software 
changes specification.  However a few issues were 
highlighted. The first issue discussed the fact that no 
traceability is provided between the software changes 
specification and the original requirements in the 
software requirements specification (SRS).  This was 
confirmed through a review of the company’s 
procedures.  This presented a difficulty for the QA 
team in determining what regression tests must be 
performed to ensure original requirements have not be 
compromised in terms of quality and safety.  It also 
emerged that the software changes specification only 
contains a header called “hazard analysis”.  The 
procedure does not state what this section should 
contain. This has also been confirmed through the 
inspection of software change specifications for several 
different projects within the company. The inspection 
showed some projects provided a reference to the 
software hazard analysis document, whereas others 
simply used the terms major, moderate or minor with a 
text description as to why the chosen category was 
assigned. This has led to inconsistencies and 
insufficiencies in terms of software hazard and risk 
analysis for software changes within the company.  
 
8.3. Lifecycle phases for software RM 
 
The RMCM model states that software risk analysis 
“should begin at the requirements phase and continue 
through to product retirement”. There was awareness 
amongst the team of the safety benefits for performing 
the software risk analysis at every lifecycle phase as 
per the RMCM. However the team did not always 
follow the procedure and this was even acknowledged, 
“the problem is we don’t follow our procedure”. When 
questioned as to what stage of the software lifecycle 
the software risk based activities were actually 
performed and when they were most beneficial, the 
responses varied.  There was a general consensus that 
the software risk analysis document was drafted at the 
requirements stage and then re-visited at the very end 
of the lifecycle (prior to product launch) but that 
“sometimes is not properly looked at in between”.  It 
was even acknowledged by interviewees that this was 
not sufficient because “if we find out at the end that 
something is missing such as a unit test or code review 
(mitigations), it can be too late because the 
development is already done”, it can be “more costly” 
and “the project is practically completed and you’re 
basically doing the RM document for the sake of it”.  
To confirm software hazard and risk analysis was 
only being performed at the start and end of the 
lifecycle, the project files were inspected to see when 
they were created and updated.  This method of 
triangulation involved inspecting the issue control 
sheets and comparing the dates of issue with the 
corresponding project phase dates.  The projects 
chosen were two major software development projects 
discussed in the interview transcripts.  Inspection of the 
issue control sheets showed that both documents had 
only two issues, the original issue drafted at phase 1 
which is the technical requirements/design phase and 
the final phase pre-release. 
The primary reasons that the RM was left until the 
very end of the lifecycle was due to “time constraints” 
and the company’s implementation of the RMCM 
practices for analysing and categorising risks were 
cumbersome.  The company generated procedure and 
associated template which were based on the RMCM 
were recognised as being sufficient in terms of the 
practices but at the same time were seen as being 
“quite a big document”, “another task to be done” and 
it “adds more work for us”.  This analysis highlights 
the need to revisit how the RMCM has been 
implemented within the company’s procedures, to 
simplify the process without removing compliance in 
terms of implementing the RMCM practices and to 
train all team members on the new process.  The use of 
the term “time constraints” also points to the need for 
management within the company to ensure adequate 
time is allocated to the software RM activities for all 
software projects.  Finally, it was  acknowledged that 
software risk based activities should commence at the 
requirements stage, but an important clarification arose 
during the interviews.  The term “Requirements” is 
used within the company to encompass both user 
requirements and the software/technical requirements.  
It’s important that software risk analysis commences as 
early as possible during the user requirements stage, 
once the URS has been completed.  The URS may 
highlight specific requirements that require 
corresponding software requirements or design items 
to mitigate potential risks, and these “should be fed 
into and be addressed in the SRS” 
 
8.4. Employee knowledge 
 
Analysis of the training records alone suggested 
that those individuals doing the analysis, mitigations 
and verification were trained appropriately.  However, 
analysis of interview transcripts pointed to a deviant 
case for this finding. 
Following self-training, where individuals read the 
internal software RM procedure, individuals were not 
proficient in performing a risk analysis of the software.  
Frustrations in implementing the new RMCM based 
procedure were attributed to this and it was suggested 
that the company should “introduce better training”. 
Given this finding, there is a need for the client to 
provide relevant personnel with a detailed training 
session using practical examples and sample projects.  
Individuals should be coached interactively during the 
process.  Reviews of the output from the software RM 
process should be performed at the various stage gates 
of the design process.   
 
9. Solution Impact (Specifying Learning) 
 
The evaluation of the RMCM has demonstrated a 
significant improvement in the company’s software 
RM procedure and required practices in terms of 
meeting regulatory compliance. For example, Table 5, 
illustrates the impact of the changes that were made in 
relation to the practice of Determining risk sources and 
categories).  
Prior to RMCM implementation, the software risk 
process satisfied 15 of the 41 required regulatory 
practices.  Following its implementation the RM 
procedure satisfies all required practices. However, the 
evaluation of the RMCM within the MD company 
identified two distinct but inter-related set of findings 
and changes required for cycle 2 of the action research 
cycle - (a) modifications to the RMCM and (b) 
modifications to the company’s procedures. 
 
Table 5. Post-RMCM implementation findings 
Determine Risk Sources and Categories 
RMCM 
Sub-
Practice 
Change Conclusions from 
Research 
1 Updated software 
RM procedure and 
template with a 
requirement to 
identify risk sources. 
RMCM has had a direct 
impact.  Client is now 
addressing the regulatory 
requirement to identify 
risk sources.  
2 Updated software RMCM has had a direct 
Determine Risk Sources and Categories 
RM procedure and 
template with 
requirement to 
categorise risk 
sources.   
impact. The client is now 
addressing the 
requirement to categorise 
risk sources.  
3 The client’s RM 
template was updated 
with a revised list of 
potential hazards and 
hazard categories. 
The practice of 
determining software 
hazards has not changed 
for the client.  However, 
they now start their 
analysis with a more up 
to date list of hazards. 
4 Requirement to 
analyse OTS failure 
as a potential hazard 
has been added to 
client’s procedure 
and template 
Updating the client’s 
procedures to include 
OTS in the hazard 
analysis has had a direct 
impact on final project 
design files. 
5 Requirement to 
analyse hardware 
failures as a potential 
hazard added to 
client’s procedure 
and template  
Updating the client’s 
procedures to include 
hardware failures in the 
hazard analysis has had a 
direct impact on final 
project design files. 
 
9.1. Modifications to the RMCM 
 
The quality of the User Requirements Specification 
(URS) and the SRS have a direct impact on the quality 
of the RM report.  Missing requirements in the URS or 
SRS may lead to missing analysis on associated risks. 
This stresses the need for documentation reviews to be 
implemented as a core risk mitigation.  Therefore, the 
RMCM will be updated to include a sub-practice 
“Formally Review all Software Lifecycle Design 
Documentation”, within specific goal 3 (Mitigate 
Risks). 
Presently, the term “Requirements” is used within 
the company to encompass both user requirements and 
the software/technical requirements. The software RM 
procedure states that risk analysis must be performed at 
the requirements stage - however this should be more 
specific. It is important that software risk analysis 
commences as early as possible during the user 
requirements stage, once the URS has been completed.  
The URS may highlight specific requirements that 
require corresponding software requirements or design 
items to mitigate potential risks, and these “should be 
fed into and be addressed in the SRS” 
User trials, which were not originally considered, 
shall be added to the RMCM as a method for detecting 
user related queries, issues and associated risk 
scenarios pre-production.  
The description for sub-practice 23 (defining 
traceability) of the RMCM shall be amended to include 
provision of traceability between the user 
requirements, the technical specification, the associated 
hazard analysis and the software verification. 
 
9.2. Modifying the company’s procedures 
 
All team members are aware of the RM procedure 
for satisfying the requirement of performing software 
RM when producing safe MD software. However 
training provided to date has been inadequate.   
Additionally, performing the base practices of the 
RMCM (i.e. GG1 practices) alone is not sufficient.  
Consideration must also be given to performing the 
level Med practices in GG2 (Institutionalise a Managed 
Process).  If no consideration is given to GG2, the base 
practices of GG1 may not be performed sufficiently or 
by the correct person.  This could have a significant 
negative impact on the software risk-analysis and 
control.  Training (GP 2.5) is a practice of GG2 and the 
first step must be to improve the training process and 
provide adequate training to all relevant personnel 
within the company.  All team members have already 
received business knowledge training through a 
number of internal workshops and practical hands-on 
exercises.   
The post-production section of the software RM 
procedure will be updated.  It will specify that changes 
requested post-production must be analysed to 
determine if the changes could adversely affect the 
safety of the software or any of the previously 
controlled risks. 
Procedures will be updated to ensure traceability 
between the software changes specification and the 
original requirements in the software requirements 
specification.  This will allow the QA team to 
determine what regression tests must be done to ensure 
original requirements have not been compromised in 
terms of quality and safety. 
The software changes specification procedure will 
be updated to state that software hazard and risk 
analyses must be performed for all changes listed and 
added to the software RM file. Thus, traceability will 
be provided from the changes specification to the 
corresponding analysis in the software RM file.  This 
will ensure a consistent method of performing risk 
analysis for software changes.  
  
10. What contributed to the success? 
 
The researchers felt that the following factors 
contributed to the initial success of the chosen method: 
the researchers’ direct access to the company’s 
employees and their cooperation at all levels 
(management and development teams); access to the 
company’s existing processes and procedures; access 
to the regulatory affairs department as well as their 
library of regulation literature, guidelines and 
standards; the researchers’ ability to directly influence 
how software is designed and developed through the 
controlled release of updated RM procedures and 
templates; support from management to support the 
research effort and its findings. 
If the company’s procedure for implementing the 
RMCM activities is too cumbersome or hard to follow, 
it runs the risk of being ineffective or not being 
implemented in the software projects.  It was suggested 
to management within the company that they must 
ensure adequate time was allocated to the software RM 
activities for all software projects. 
The company involved in the research required a 
CMMI based implementation.  Therefore, the focus of 
the research was on implementing FDA requirements 
with this particular model. We have no reason to 
believe that other models would not be successful if 
they were similarly modified.   
 
11. Additional validation & generalisation  
 
Although the RMCM has only been trialled in one 
MD company, the model is equally applicable to all 
MD companies building software under the regulatory 
constraints of the BSI and FDA. To support this 
assertion, a dedicated steering group of MD companies 
who develop software was arranged.  The participants 
were based in Ireland but their organisations were 
global organisations that were constrained by both the 
BSI and FDA regulations.  The RMCM was presented 
to the companies with time allocated for feedback on 
the model.  The overall response to the model was very 
positive as it was seen that the RMCM “offers the 
opportunity to get it right first time” for MD software 
RM.  There were no modifications suggested for the 
model. 
The client’s implementation of the RMCM was 
subjected to both a formal BSI audit and a pre-FDA 
audit. Following inspection there were no major 
findings suggested to the client with respect to their 
software RM practices.   
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